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1 Introduction
Smallholder agriculture represents 80 percent of all farms in Africa (AGRA, 2014). Yet, pro-
ductivity levels are low, and progress has been slow (Wiggins, 2014). Small-scale farms are
typically family-run businesses, very often with members of the farm household cultivating sep-
arate plots (Guirkinger and Platteau, 2015). Farm households are repeatedly found to make
inefficient allocations of productive resources across plots, especially in West Africa.1 Most often,
within-household misallocation is gendered, with too few inputs used on female-controlled plots
(Doss, 2018). Yet little is known about the causes of these inefficiencies.
Determining the exact source of allocative inefficiency is key to designing solutions to raise the
production capacity of farm households. While long-term interactions between spouses should
offer an incentive to maximize household income (Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss, 2014), there
is growing evidence that spouses hide actions or resources from each other (Anderson and Baland,
2002; Ashraf, 2009) and that they fail to communicate effectively (Ziparo, 2016; Ashraf, Field,
Voena, and Ziparo, 2019). However, the extent to which asymmetric information is problematic in
households has been questioned (Browning, Chiappori, and Lechene, 2010)2 and existing evidence
on the role of private information in spouses’ decisions is at best mixed (Mani, 2011; Kebede,
Tarazona, Munro, and Verschoor, 2014). Recent contributions point to heterogeneity in response
to private information - see, e.g. (Hoel, 2015) - but fall short of offering a theoretical framework
to clarify the roles of private information and communication failure within the household.
To fill this gap, we investigate the farm household’s capacity to reach efficiency and share
information on the production side. We explore, both theoretically and empirically, the hetero-
geneity in responses to private information on production. To do so, we design an experiment,
build a model consistent with the key findings from our experiment, and test the model’s pre-
dictions further. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to link heterogeneity in
intrahousehold expenditure arrangements to the capacity to reach efficiency and share informa-
tion in agricultural production. We highlight how conflict in consumption allocation impacts
inefficiencies in production. We show that the extent of allocative inefficiency in production is
heterogenous, like responses to information frictions and to increased returns on investment in
the wife’s plot. Our model suggests it is spouses’ inability to communicate effectively that can
generate an extra loss of efficiency under private information. When private information is verifi-
able ex post, there are no longer any extra losses in efficiency from information friction. We take
these predictions back to the data and find evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions.
For our experiment, we build on standard lab-in-the-field games of resource-sharing within
the household (Munro, 2018), adding an information component. The experiment, contextualized
as an input allocation game, involves couples of Togolese cotton producers living in marital
relationships. Each couple plays a series of two games. In all rounds, spouses can communicate
prior to the decision, which is made privately by the husband. First, we ask each husband to
decide whether to invest in his own plot of land with low returns or in his wife’s land with high
1Following Udry (1996)’s seminal paper, evidence of allocative inefficiencies in agriculture was gathered by
Akresh (2008) for Burkina Faso; Rangel and Thomas (2012) for Ghana and Senegal; Andrews, Golan, and Lay
(2015) for Uganda; and Guirkinger, Platteau, and Goetghebuer (2015) for Mali.
2They argue that it “is probably less problematic in households than in other types of relationship (say, between
employers and employees or insurers and insurees), because the very nature of the relationship often implies deep
mutual knowledge and improved monitoring ability”.
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returns but where the payoff will be hers rather than to his. Incentives are such that any deviation
from allocating all of the endowment to his wife’s land implies a loss of efficiency to the household.
We find that male farmers allocate too few inputs to their wife’s plot in the game, failing to
maximize household aggregate profits. We observe efficiency losses of 17.8 percent. In the second
round, we triple the returns on investing in female-controlled plots. Men respond to increased
returns from their wife’s plot by investing more in it. In this second round, we also experimentally
manipulate the information available to husbands. We randomly assign couples to one of three
treatments: (1) full information, as in the base game, (2) hidden information, in which women are
offered the opportunity to hide the true return from their husbands, (3) verifiable information, in
which, while women can hide the true return from their husbands, the information is verifiable
ex post. Private information held by women on their plots’ returns has no effect on average on
men’s allocation decisions, whether or not this information is verifiable ex post.
In order to rationalize production inefficiencies, we investigate non-cooperative interactions
between spouses.3 We propose a non-cooperative model of household production and consump-
tion decisions and study conditions under which efficiency in production is reached under full
information on returns from plots. The model is sequential. Men first decide how much to al-
locate to the female plot and then each spouse chooses his/her consumption bundle. Spouses
jointly consume some household public goods, such as cooking, home maintenance, child care
and education. Notably, preferences for these public goods differ across spouses.4 This has two
important implications.
First, we show that even non-cooperative spouses find it optimal to maximize joint agricultural
income when both contribute to the provision of a household public good (Bergstrom, Blume,
and Varian, 1986). However, in equilibrium not all spouses in all households contribute to the
provision of all goods. Three regimes of household behavior are obtained endogenously according
to spouses’ preferences and relative incomes: (1) a joint contributor regime in which both spouses
choose to contribute to one public good, (2) a breadwinner regime in which only one of the
spouses contributes to all public goods and (3) a specialization regime in which each chooses to
contribute to separate public goods.5 Importantly, productive decisions critically depend on the
regimes identified above: male farmers efficiently allocate inputs between their plot and their
spouse’s plot under the joint contribution regime, somewhat inefficiently under specialization and
very inefficiently when they are the household breadwinners.
Second, when asymmetric information is added to the model, we show that it aggravates
allocative inefficiency in production only under specialization, having no impact on households
under joint contribution and on those with a breadwinner. We also show that, even though
communication between spouses is possible, husband and wife do not communicate effectively
3In a static collective model, the household should maximize profit and then allocate consumption according to
a sharing rule that cannot make one of the spouses better-off without making the other spouse worse-off (Browning,
Chiappori, and Weiss, 2014). When limited commitment is introduced (Mazzocco, 2007; Voena, 2015), household
members may renegotiate the sharing rule but production efficiency should be attained for those who remain in a
cooperative equilibrium. An alternative model can take into account the endogeneity of spouses’ outside options
(Basu, 2006). The additional income gained in the experiment is too small for outside options to be affected. Thus,
this alternative model cannot explain our experimental findings.
4Note that we do not stipulate the nature of the public good (children’s education, home maintenance, etc.) for
which preferences are heterogenous. This can differ across households or be dictated by a social norm.
5The specialization regime is akin to the separate-sphere regime described in Lundberg and Pollak (1993), but
endogenously determined given spouses’ preferences and relative incomes rather than dictated by social norms.
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and cannot avoid additional losses due to the information asymmetries. This, in turn, implies
that ex post verifiability may help curb the extra loss from private information. If inefficiencies
were rooted in difficulties enforcing a marital agreement, ex post verifiability would not be effective
in limiting the deleterious effects of private information.
Our model predicts heterogeneity in the extent to which farm households make inefficient
production choices under information asymmetries. We examine these predictions in the light of
the experimental data, analyzing heterogeneity in the impact of our treatments across households.
We classify households, albeit imperfectly, in three different regimes according to the choices made
in the first round of the experiment: very efficient, somewhat efficient, very inefficient. We analyze
how these different households respond to the information treatments in the second round of the
experiment. Comparing choices made under the hidden and full information treatments, we
find that the effects of asymmetric information are heterogenous. It is only the households that
experienced the largest losses in the first round whose efficiency losses increase. These are a mix
of breadwinners and households in the specialization regime. Since only the latter are expected
to be affected, we obtain a lower-bound for households in the specialization regime. Comparing
choices made under the verifiable and full information treatments, there is no heterogeneity in
impact and none of three groups of households responds to the information friction. As predicted
by the model, when spouses know that the information will be revealed ex post, information
friction does not affect the efficiency of decisions.
This paper contributes to four strands of the literature. In the standard farm household
model, households work as an economic unit making production and consumption decisions
(Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986). When markets fail, these decisions are no longer separa-
ble (LaFave and Thomas, 2016), and production can no longer be treated as independent of
household members’ preferences. As such, the standard model predicts inefficient allocation of
resources across households but efficient allocation within the household. Our contribution is to
highlight other sources of inefficiency resulting in intrahousehold inefficient allocative decisions.
Within the theoretical literature on household decision-making, our model is closest to Brown-
ing, Chiappori, and Lechene (2010)’s model of consumption choices (BCL 2010). That paper
extends Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) to a setting with many public goods. BCL (2010)
find that, in general, household members will either specialize in the provision of certain house-
hold public goods or jointly produce at most one. (Only) in the latter case, spouses fully pool
income as in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986). We add to BCL (2010) a production stage.
We model households engaged in agricultural production, thereby endogenizing spouses’ incomes
generated from female- and male-controlled plots. Our results also relate to those of Doepke
and Tertilt (2018), who extend BCL (2010) to an environment in which spouses incomes are
endogenous to their time investments in public goods produced in the household.6
We also extend the analysis to a setting in which some information is privately held. By
doing so, we contribute to the literature studying information frictions within the household.
Fafchamps (2001) shows that information asymmetries reduce spouses’ ability to enforce marital
agreements . In contrast, we focus here on conditions under which agreements are self-enforced,
exploring different regimes of decision-making. Household choices and responses to information
6As in our model, when spouses specialize in the provision of different public goods, there is no income-pooling.
However, given that their model exhibits a continuum of public goods each of which is infinitesimal, joint contri-
bution to a public good is not sufficient to guarantee the neutrality of income redistribution in the family.
3
asymmetries critically depend on the regime in which they operate. The heterogeneity predicted
is in line with evidence from our experiment as well as with recent evidence found in other contexts
(Angelucci and Garlick, 2016; Hoel, 2015; Hoel, Hidrobo, Bernard, and Ashour, 2017).
Finally, we extend the framework to allow for cheap talk between spouses. We contribute to a
small and emerging literature on the role of communication within the household (Ziparo, 2016;
Ashraf, Field, Voena, and Ziparo, 2019). In relation to this literature, our main contribution is to
offer the first lab-in-the-field experiment testing cheap talk in the household.7 In our framework,
communication between spouses cannot mitigate the additional efficiency loss from information
asymmetries. This last result contrasts with predictions from a model in which spouses are in-
volved in non-binding agreements (Fafchamps, 2001). According to our model, when information
is verifiable ex post, even though privately held at the time of the decision, the husband can
trust his wife to truthfully reveal it and the household should not suffer additional efficiency loss
from the asymmetric information. The inefficiency will not be mitigated by ex post verifiability
if instead the issue is imperfect enforcement of marital agreements. Moreover, the expected effect
of ex post verifiability is limited to those households who operate in a separate-sphere regime.
Our experimental findings from the verifiable information treatment are not consistent with the
implications from a model of limited enforcement, but consistent with the prediction from our
model.
To summarize, allocative inefficiency in production decisions may arise because of the nature of
the intrahousehold decision-making process. Depending on spouses’ preferences and their income
gap, households may operate according to different behavior regimes. As a result, asymmetric
information within the household will exacerbate inefficiency for some households but have no
effect on others. Since the increase in efficiency loss under asymmetric information may be due
to ineffective communication between spouses, it might be avoided if agricultural development
programs targeting women also provided information to their spouses.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the sample and
our experiment and present the key stylized facts gathered from it. In Section 3, we outline our
model and describe its theoretical predictions. We test the heterogeneity in responses predicted
by the model in Section 4 and we conclude in Section 5.
2 The setting, experimental conditions and preliminary evidence
The objective of this section is to describe the experimental setting, data collection, experimental
conditions and our main findings from the experiment. The experiment is designed as a game
of input allocation across female- and male-controlled plots. It is similar to an investment game
except that individual payoffs are made to each spouse separately. We expect three key factors to
condition choices: returns on investment (inputs), private information held on these returns and
communication between spouses. These key factors have also been addressed by other papers in
the experimental literature (e.g. Ashraf, 2009; Kebede, Tarazona, Munro, and Verschoor, 2014;
Hoel, 2015). Importantly, the use of lab-based findings to mirror real-life decisions in agriculture
has found some support in the literature (Hoel, Hidrobo, Bernard, and Ashour, 2017).
7Ziparo (2016) studies theoretically cheap talk on income realizations between husband and wife. Ashraf, Field,
Voena, and Ziparo (2019) is the first large-scale randomized controlled trial looking for causal evidence on the
effects of communication failure in the context of household fertility choices.
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2.1 Experimental setting and data collection
The experiment was conducted in Togo, in the Plateaux Region. According to the most recent
national census, 97 percent of the population in Togo is employed in agriculture, 51 percent of
agricultural producers are female, and 82 percent of them live in households headed by a man
(National Agricultural Census 2012-2014). The Plateaux Region is the main cash crop production
area of the country, producing principally cotton along with coffee and cacao.
Participants were recruited with the help of Nouvelle Societe Cotonnaise du Togo (NSCT),
in charge of organizing the cotton industry. Our sample was drawn from the latest census of
cotton producers conducted in the region by NSCT, which identified 15,515 cotton producers,
1,081 of them women.8 We focused on couples both of whom are involved in cotton production,
restricting to individuals aged 18 and above. After excluding polygamous households and couples
residing in the remotest areas, our sample contained 150 couples out of the total population of
359 couples. This was reduced to a final sample size of 141 couples after verification of marital
status.
The experiment took place in NSCT facilities and in school buildings located in five central
localities in the region during October 2016. On each site, we interviewed participants from several
surrounding villages. Each experimental session, followed by survey data collection, lasted for
two hours. To avoid contamination of untreated households, we interviewed all participants from
a given geographical area on the same day. Ten trained field experimenters supervized by one of
the authors worked in pairs.9 Protocols were provided in both French and Ewe and field workers
were also fluent in the other local languages (Ife, Moba, Lamba, Kotokoli and Kabye).
When participants arrived, husbands and wives were separated. They first received a show-up
fee and were then invited to participate in the experiment. The allocation choices made by hus-
bands during the experiment were recorded and are our main outcome of interest. Directly after
completion of the experiment, a survey was administered separately to husbands and wives. After
a short debriefing on the game, the survey included questions on demographics, assets, education,
literacy/counting tests, occupations, social preferences and risk aversion. We also inquired about
information-sharing within the couple, about who decides on how to exploit the individual’s main
plot and about who is responsible fot the main goods produced by the households and their main
expenditures. Both male and female respondents also reported their individual share of broad
categories of expenses.
We decided to study monogamous rather than polygamous households, knowing that only
17% of men aged 20-49 in Togo are polygamous (20 percent in the Plateaux Region).10 Our
findings are thus representative of decision-making outcomes for 80 percent of men and women
living in couples and producing cotton in the Plateaux Region.
2.2 Sample description
Tables 1 to 3 provide some summary statistics from our surveys. Table 1 shows that the couples
are in a marital arrangement, with the male typically the head of household. Most couples are
8The census was presented at the NSCT board meeting in September 2016.
9Training of field experimenters and piloting of the experiment took a total of two weeks.
10These statistics are computed using DHS 2010 data.
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in a long-term relationship (average 19 years), with 4.8 children on average.11 There is a seven-
year age difference on average (men 44, women 37 years old). About 49 percent of both men and
women attended or completed primary school. Though the level of literacy is higher for men than
for women, both spouses scored high on numeracy.12 The spouses’ income is spent on different
household public goods: men spend more on health while women’s spending is more food-related.
Finally, there is some heterogeneity in living standards: just fewer than 10 percent experienced
hunger in the three months prior to the survey, while more than half of them own a motorcycle.
Agricultural production is described in Table 2. Both males and females alike control the
production of cotton on at least one plot belonging to the farm household. Average plot area
controlled by females (males) is 1.74 (7.34) hectares. Men and women interpret ”control of one’s
plot” differently. Roughly 66 percent of women consider that they control a plot only if they
have total control over the income it generates and over input choices, while 19 percent equate
control with controlling income. By comparison, 83 percent of men believe they need to control
both income and inputs before they can consider the plot their own.
Consistent with evidence from other West African countries, information-sharing within the
household is imperfect (Table 2). Though 74 percent (respectively 57 percent) of males (females)
state that they have a good knowledge of the value of the produce from their spouse’s main
plot during the last agricultural season, 55 percent (respectively 46 percent) would still like to
know more. Similarly, while a large proportion state that their spouse knows how much they
produce on their main plot, about 40 percent still think their spouse would like to know more.
Asymmetric information will be one of the key factors affecting input allocation choices that we
will experimentally vary in the game.
Also consistent with evidence gathered in the sub-region (Doss, 2018), men are responsible
for making input allocation decisions (Table 3). In fact, according to female respondents, most
husbands have a say in the allocation of inputs to female-controlled plots. Men are in most cases
the sole decision-makers. On average across the different types of inputs (domestic and hired
labor, fertilizers and seeds) used on female plots, 61 percent of them make the allocation decision
on their own, and 19 percent share the decision with their wife. On average, only 17 percent of
females choose on their own the quantity of inputs used on their own plots. In the experiment
and the model, men are responsible for the allocation of inputs across plots of land.
2.3 Experimental conditions
After receiving a show-up fee, participants were told they had the opportunity to earn more
depending on the decisions made in a series of two games. These games were contextualized as
input allocation games to place the subjects in familiar decision-making situations and to address
the paper’s research question.
It was the men who made the decisions. The womens’ role in the games was to discuss the
situation with their husbands prior to the decision. The men were told to decide how many of
a total of 10 tokens (input units) to allocate to two boxes of different colors representing plots
generating income for either husband or wife. A male participant had to decide whether to invest
11Husbands also have a non-negligible number of off-spring outside the official union: they have on average 2
children with other women, while the wives’ average is 0.3.
12 Most of the game instructions were read out loud to allow for participants’ varying litteracy skills.
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in his own plot of land with low returns or in his wife’s land with high returns but a payoff to
her and not him. We chose to have constant returns to scale production functions for the sake
of simplicity. In all treatments, there was only one action that would maximize the household
payoff: to allocate all inputs to the wife’s plot.
Treatments
Base Treatment Figure 1 provides a reminder of the structure of the experiment. The base
treatment (BT) took place during the first round under rules common to all participants. Im-
portantly, in BT, all information was available to both husbands and wives. Choices made under
BT allow us to test decision-making efficiency at the farm-household level and estimate efficiency
losses under full information about returns. Given that the return on women’s plots was twice
as high as on men’s plots, we have the following:
Female Payoff = 2y
Male Payoff = 10− y
where y is the number of tokens allocated to the wife’s plot. At BT, the efficiency loss,
expressed as discarded surplus as a share of the maximum potential household earnings, can be
written as follows:
Efficiency Loss = 1− 10+y20
Each token had a value of 100 FCFA (about US $ 0.17). Thus, for each token that a husband
did not invest on his wife’s plot, the household incurred a monetary loss of 100 FCFA. The
maximum household surplus at BT was 2,000 FCFA, i.e. US $3.42 at the current exchange rate.
Productivity Treatment The second-round game allows us to test if and how households react
to (i) an increase in the returns on the wife’s plot and (ii) information asymmetries. Between the
first and second rounds, we increased the ratio of returns from two to three, and therefore call
the second-round game “the productivity treatment”, or PT. Given that the return on women’s
plots was now three times as high as on men’s plots, we have the following:
Female Payoff = 3y
Male Payoff = 10− y
where again y is the number of tokens allocated to the wife’s plot. Thus, the efficiency loss
in the second round can be written as follows:
Efficiency Loss = 1− 10+2y30
Marginal loss was higher in PT than in BT. For each token that husbands did not invest in
the more productive female controlled plot, the household forwent 200 FCFA. The maximum
household surplus at PT was 3,000 FCFA, i.e. US $5.14 at the current exchange rate.
In addition to increasing returns from women’s plots, we also randomly assigned couples to
one of three treatments:
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1. a full information treatment in which the experimenter provided all the information on the
returns (ET, for experimenter treatment),
2. a hidden information treatment (HT, for hidden treatment) in which the experimenter
informed only the wife of the value of the return from her plot. Husbands received the
information by their wives.
3. a verifiable information treatment in which husbands received the information from their
wives but both knew that the experimenter would reveal the true returns after the decision
was made (RT, for revealed treatment).
Treatment ET was designed like the base treatment, but with returns on investment in the
wife’s plot three times as high as on husband’s plot. HT was very close in design to ET, except
that women could strategically manipulate the information on returns from their plots. In ET
(respectively HT), the experimenter (respectively the wife) was in charge of communicating this
piece of information. RT was is very close in design to HT, except that the information was
asymmetric prior to decision-making, although verifiable ex post. Note that in the information
treatments (HT and RT), the experimenter told both spouses that the returns from female plots
are at least as large were in the base treatment (BT). Appendix A provides a thorough description
of the protocol.
Communication
Once they had received all the instructions and had shown that they understood them, husbands
and wives were instructed to talk to each other for five minutes before the men made their decisions
privately. In the real world, while women may have an informational advantage concerning returns
from their own plots, spouses can be expected to talk about them. Indeed, communication
between spouses may help them lessen the negative impact of the information asymmetry. In
the experiment, we allowed time for pre-play communication between spouses in all treatments
without monitoring their discussions.
The issue of couples’ lab behavior
Because participants in our experiment live in a marital relationship, we face three key challenges.
First, the behavior observed in the lab may be undone once the spouses leave the lab but continue
interacting, making the experiment less informative. To obtain more reliable information, we gave
the players the opportunity to hide their payoffs. We used two means: private payments to players
and a system of lotteries that made it possible to conceal the exact value of payments received by
male participants. Indeed, despite our privately-made payments, women could have guessed the
decision simply from the amount paid directly to them. To avoid this, both husband and wife
knew that their earnings would be partly determined by a series of two lotteries. The outcome of
the first lottery would determine whether they were remunerated on the basis of decisions made
in the first round or in the second round. The second lottery introduced a state of the world in
which they might earn zero. However, expected earnings in each round would be equal to the
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payoffs without the lottery.13 Both spouses knew the basic structure of the lotteries, but wives
could not observe their outcomes.14 As a result, wives are not able to infer from their gains their
husband’s decision and payoff. According to debriefing data, most women (53 percent) declared
they did not know how much their husband earned in the lab; only 26 percent felt confident in
predicting the men’s earnings.
A final concern is specific to the hidden information treatment. Despite privately-made pay-
ments, women may not be able to hide their payoffs after stepping out of the lab. Husbands may
force them to reveal how much they earned and could then learn whether their wife misreported
information to them. The risk is that women may not correctly anticipate their husband behavior
outside the lab (if they do, the threat should make them report truthfully the piece of information
they hold). The risk that some women wrongly anticipate their husband response is probably
low, but not null. Participants provided informed consent and were explicitly told they could
leave the lab at any time and would still get to keep their show-up fee.
2.4 A first look at the experimental evidence
Table 4 compares investment decisions, efficiency losses and payoffs under each experimental
condition.
Husbands in the first round (BT) were fully informed by the enumerators about the exper-
imental conditions. Despite full information, we find that most failed to maximize aggregate
profits (first column of Table 4). On average, they invested 6.42 tokens in their wife’s plot, short
of the optimal investment had they maximized household aggregate payoff (i.e., 10 tokens). Their
decisions resulted in average earnings of 1,287 FCFA for their wives. Husbands decided to forgo
356 FCFA in aggregate earnings to the household in order to have full control of them. The de-
cisions taken by the husbands yielded an average efficiency loss of 17.8 percent. Recall that two
lotteries were run at the end of both rounds, enabling the husbands to hide their earnings from
their wives (but not vice-versa). Forgoing aggregate income may thus be an optimal response
when a marital agreement over the sharing of income is costly to enforce. If so, the aggregate
earnings loss to the household would provide a measure of these transaction costs.15
Recall now that a randomly selected fraction of participants also experienced the full informa-
tion condition in the second round (ET). Our findings for this group are qualitatively consistent
with those under BT (second column of Table 4). Even under increased returns on investments in
their wife’s plot, men failed to maximize household aggregate output. In comparison to BT, they
slightly increased the number of tokens they invested in their wife’s plot to 6.72. Their decisions
also yielded significantly higher average earnings (2038 FCFA) by wives. Despite the increased
investment in the wife’s plot, however, aggregate losses to the household were significantly larger
in both absolute and relative terms. Households under ET experienced an average efficiency loss
of 21.3 percent, a significant 3.5 p.p. increase as compared to BT. In monetary terms, this rep-
resents an average of 641 FCFA in forgone earnings to the household.16 Average male earnings
13With 50% chance of drawing round 1 or round 2, maximum expected earnings are (2, 000 + 3, 000)/2 = 2, 500
FCFA, representing US$4.28 at current exchange rate and PPP$11.64. Estimated annual income per capita is
PPP$1,700.
14See Appendix A for more details on the structure of the lotteries.
15On average, PPP $1.65.
16That is PPP $2.97.
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were 320 FCFA. This implies that, on average, men were willing to forgo 2 FCFA in aggregate
household earnings for each additional FCFA over which they have full control.
More generally, when round 1 (BT) is compared to round 2 (PT), (last column of Table 4),
investments in female-controlled plots are also seen to increase slightly on average, while efficiency
loss significantly increases by 4 p.p. Male earnings significantly drop by an average 29 FCFA,
while female earnings significantly increase by an average 730 FCFA. Between round 1 to round
2, household aggregate earnings increase while, and at the same time, forgone household earnings
also increase (average change in forgone earnings of +299 FCFA). The empirical distributions of
transfers are shown in Figure 2. We observe 5 percent of the data at BT = PT = 10 and no
mass at BT = PT = 0. The remaining 95 percent show intermediate values of transfers.
Experimental conditions in round 2 differ from those in round 1 along two dimensions: we
increased the returns on investing in female-controlled plots and we manipulated the extent of
information available about these returns. Nevertheless, differences in husbands’ choices between
ET and BT are driven only by the increased returns (see second paragraph in this section).17
We now focus on comparing the information treatments (HT and RT) to ET (columns 2, 3
and 4 of Table 4). The random assignment to treatment ensures that differences in choice can be
attributed exclusively to the treatment conditions. Comparing HT to ET, we can isolate the effect
of empowering women with a piece of information hidden (HT) from their husbands. Husbands
knew the difference in returns in round 2 was at least as large as in round 1, but not precisely
how much larger it was. The women were given this information, which they could attempt to
communicate to their husbands before the men made the allocation decision. Surprisingly, in
HT the hidden information has a small and statistically insignificant effect on the number of
tokens men invest in female-controlled plots, on efficiency loss (statistically insignificant 1.8 p.p.
effect) and on aggregate forgone earnings (statistically insignificant 27 FCFA increase). Condition
RT is very similar to HT except that in RT both spouses knew that the private information
woulds be revealed ex post. We find that the average effect of RT is also small and statistically
insignificant. Thus, we can conclude that on average, the husbands were not influenced by the
fact that their wives held private information, regardless of whether this private information was
ex post verifiable.
To sum up, we find that increasing returns to investment in female-controlled plots leads to
increased investment in these plots but also to increased efficiency losses. We find little average
impact of information asymmetries on husbands input allocation choices.
It may be that our information treatments do not aggravate inefficiency if ex ante commu-
nication between spouses is effective in wiping out the asymmetry of information. Yet even in
the absence of information frictions, we still observe large efficiency losses. How can allocative
inefficiency under full information be explained? We conjectured that these inefficiencies may
arise from difficulties enforcing a marital agreement over the sharing of income. But if this ex-
planation were to hold, we would expect (1) information frictions to aggravate the inefficiencies,
(2) ex post revelation to be ineffective in curbing the extra efficiency loss from the information
friction. Our findings from the information treatments, however, are not consistent with this
17The difference could also capture changes associated with other factors that change with time. These would
include learning effects. Since we had participants play several rounds for practice prior to round 1, we are
reasonably confident that the learning took place during the practice rounds. Also, participants did not learn
about other participants’ behavior between rounds.
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explanation: we do not find that on average inefficiencies are exacerbated by in our different
information treatments.
In the remainder of the paper, our objective is to offer an explanation for the observed
efficiency losses under full information highlighting heterogeneity in responses to the treatment
conditions. As we will see in section 3, the model provides clear predictions regarding optimal
response to increasing returns and private information for different household arrangements. We
test them in section 4.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we provide a theoretical framework rationalizing the key findings of the experiment.
We analyze decision-making in the farm household with respect to the three key determinants
- studied in the experiment - of the allocation of productive resources: returns on investment,
private information about these returns and communication between spouses. Our model yields
fine predictions on the effects of these factors: we obtain several testable predictions that allow
us to go back to the data and test the validity of our theoretical framework.
3.1 Benchmark model: full information
Consider a married couple who has to decide both on the allocation of productive inputs and on
expenditures, given individual preferences and individual budget constraints.
We assume that spouses farm separate plots18 and that their individual income depends on
an exogenous income Y j and on the produce from of the individual plots. We assume that the
husband and the wife have different production technologies and that the input productivity on
the husband’s land is lower than on that of the wife.19 Thus, the agricultural income (assuming
output prices normalized to 1) of the two spouses is:
IH = fH(xH) = xH ,
IW = fW (xW ) = kxW ,
where k is the difference in productivity between the husband and the wife and xi the amount of
input on the plot of each spouse.
Assumption I: k > 1.
Assumption 1 means that each unit of input used on a female-controlled plot generates more
output than the same unit used on a male-controlled plot.
We also assume that the husband is the owner of the household’s inputs B, and that he has
to decide on how to allocate them across plots. Hence, depending on the allocation, husband and
wife use the same input in different proportions. The only difference between their production
technologies is the difference in marginal returns on investment. The total income of each spouse,
18The growing individualization of plots in farm households has been widely debated in the recent development
literature. See Guirkinger and Platteau (2017) for a review.
19We assume a linear production function for each spouse. This is a simplifying assumption: we assume that we
are located on the side of the real production function where the wife’s plot is more productive than her husband’s.
We thus use the linear approximation to simplify computations and match the experimental design.
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Rj , is given by:
RH = Y H + IH = Y H + (B − t),
RW = Y W + IW = Y W + kt,
where t ∈ [0, B] is the amount of inputs that the husband decides to invest in the wife’s plot.
The household’s income is then RH + RW . We start by analyzing a problem where both the
exogenous income and the productivity of the female-controlled plot of land are perfectly known.
The efficient production decision is to allocate all the resources to the wife to use on her plot.
This choice maximizes the household income available to finance both household public good
provision and private consumption (See Appendix B.1 for the proof).
In our environment, husband and wife also have to decide on resource allocation across private
consumption and public good provision. In developing countries, frequent income shocks, short
life expectancy and strong gender norms may lead to commitment problems.20 Thus, we assume
that the spouses behave non-cooperatively in the consumption decision process and we study
the incentives to maximize productive income, given individual incentives for consumption. Our
theoretical model is based on that of Browning, Chiappori, and Lechene (2010). A key assumption
in this respect is that spouses have different relative preferences for the different public goods.
We assume the preferences of each spouse take the following form:
UH = log(cH) + log(QA) + log(QB),
for the husband, and
UW = log(cW ) + α log(QA) + log(QB),
for the wife, with cj the private consumption of each spouse j = H,W , QA = q
H
A + q
W
A and
QB = q
H
B + q
W
B two continuous public goods, and with q
j
i , i = A,B the individual contributions
to those public goods. The contributions of the two spouses are perfect substitutes.
Assumption II: α > 1.
This assumption implies that the wife has a stronger preference for good A than for good B
and a stronger preference than the husband for this good.
The individual budget of spouse j, given his/her income, is the following:
Rj = cj + qjA + q
j
B.
The intra-household input and consumption allocations are determined sequentially. First,
the husband determines the optimal amount of transfers and then both spouses simultaneously
decide on their contribution to the household public goods. We will thus solve the household’s
problem by backward induction. We first determine the optimal household consumption decisions
as a function of transfers. Then we compute the optimal allocation of productive resources.
In the second stage, each spouse maximizes, for a given level of inputs to the wife’s plot (t),
his/her own utility choosing his/her own level of private consumption cj(t) and own contribution
to the public good (qj(t) ), given own income (Rj(t)) and taking as given the contribution of the
other. The optimal consumption allocation allows us to define, for each spouse, his/her indirect
20See Baland and Ziparo (2018) for a richer discussion.
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utility V j .
Then, in the first stage, the husband determines the optimal level of transfers, t, taking as
given the intra-household equilibrium of the second stage. He maximizes:
max
t
V H(t)
subject to t ≤ B.
where V H(t) is the indirect utility of the husband.
Assumption III: k < k¯.
We define k¯ as the maximum level of productivity below which there is no change in public
good contributions in the household. Given that our experiment induces only a marginal increase
in productive inputs, we expect to observe no change in public good contribution regime in our
experimental set-up. Moreover, in real life, the difference in input productivity is not very large.
Solving this problem by backward induction , we have the following proposition (see Appendix
B.2 for the proof):
Proposition 1. Under Assumption I-III, there exist four threshold levels of the relative income
S = Y
H+B−t
Y H+B−t+YW+kt of the two spouses that determine optimal public good contributions and
transfers:
(i) qHA = q
H
B > 0 q
W
A = q
W
B = 0 t
∗ = 0 for S > S4
(ii) 0 < qHA < q
H
B q
W
A > 0, q
W
B = 0 t
∗ = B for S3 < S ≤ S4
(iii) qHA = 0, q
H
B > 0 q
W
A > 0, q
W
B = 0 B > t
∗ > 0 for S2 < S ≤ S3
(iv) qHA = 0, q
H
B > 0 q
W
A > q
W
B > 0 t
∗ = B for S1 < S ≤ S2
(v) qHA = q
H
B = 0 q
W
A > q
W
B > 0 t
∗ = 0 for S ≤ S1
As shown in the proof of proposition 1, the spouses’ contributions to each public good depend
on the relative total income (labor plus agricultural) of each spouse. In particular, we can define
three regimes: the breadwinner regime (cases (i) and (v) above) arising when one spouse is
richer than the other and he/she becomes the only contributor to both public goods; the joint-
contribution regime (cases (ii) and (iv) above) when spouses contribute simultaneously to
one of the two public goods when resources are asymmetrically distributed across spouses; the
separate-sphere regime (case (iii) above) when spouses have comparable resources and each
spouse specializes in his/her preferred public good.
When deciding the optimal allocation of resources, the husband takes into account which
regime prevails in the second stage. When the husband is the breadwinner, the wife would
rather spend her limited income on the consumption of a private good. As long as the change
in productivity does not change the regime , there is no benefit to him from sharing even if told
that the investment would be much more profitable on his wife’s plot, as he expects her to spend
any additional income on her own consumption.
When the joint-contribution regime kicks in, income neutrality allows spouses to reach
productive efficiency. When the wife is not getting enough of her preferred public good from the
contributions of her husband, she wants to supplement his contribution. Their joint provision
creates a kind of income-pooling. Husbands therefore find it advantageous to make efficient farm
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decisions.21
As the income gap between spouses decreases further, spouses may find it more advantageous
to switch to a regime where each of them contributes to only one public good. A separate-sphere
regime may arise when husband and wife care differently about distinct household
public goods. As a man’s income decreases relative to his wife’s, he may be getting too much
of his wife’s preferred public good to equate the marginal utility he gets from this public good to
the marginal utility he gets from consuming the other goods he cares about (private and public).
He will thus prefer to contribute solely to his preferred public good. When each contributes
separately to one public good, this will affect the husband’s incentive to share any additional
resources with his wife. She would spend the additional income not only on her private good
but also on her preferred public good, from which he benefits too. However, he knows his wife
cares more about this particular public good than he does, so he will not invest all of the extra
resources in the wife’s plot. Instead, he will invest in his wife’s plot until he equalizes the marginal
benefits he derives from each public good, which amounts to partial sharing. In addition, in this
case, it is not enough for him to know that the returns from his wife’s plot are much higher; he
needs to know how much higher they are to find the optimal level of transfer.
3.2 Unobserved wife’s productivity and communication
We have identified one source of production inefficiency in the conflicting interests behind con-
sumption allocations. An additional source of inefficiencies may be information asymmetries. In
particular, the husband may be poorly informed about how much more productive the wife’s plot
is compared to his own. Even if the wife has correct information about her agricultural returns,
she may be unable to effectively communicate them to the husband, again due to conflicting
interests in consumption.
Thus, in line with the experimental setting, we now study the equilibrium in transfers and
public good provision when the wife’s higher productivity is not completely observed by the
husband. We assume that the husband knows that his wife’s plot is more productive than his
own, but not by how much (k). The wife is completely informed, meaning she knows the value
of both her productivity and her husband’s. She is also aware that her husband does not have
complete information.
Seeking to determine whether the wife’s message about her productivity is credible to the
husband, we introduce a communication phase that takes place before the transfer stage. Com-
munication is costless (cheap-talk): the wife does not pay a direct utility cost for sending a
particular message.
There are three stages to the game: in the first, the information transmission takes place; in
the second, based on the signal given by the wife, the husband decides how much to transfer; in
the third, both spouses contribute to the public goods and to private consumption. After the wife
sends a signal m to the husband with respect to her productivity, transfers followed by public
good contributions take place.
We study the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the three-stage game. The communication
technology of the wife corresponds to all the possible k belonging to its probability distribution
F (k) defined over the interval M = [kL, kH ] so that M = [kL, kH ] is the set of feasible signals.
21Given the game settings, they should transfer all of the resources to their wife.
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The equilibrium will consist of a family of signaling rules h(m|k) : ∫Mh(m|k)dm = 1 and an
equilibrium of transfers t(m) and public good contributions q(m) = (QA(m), QB(m)) such that:
max
m
UW (t(m), QA(m), QB(m)|k),
and the husband solves:
max
t
E[V H |m]
Solving this problem, and defining S3(II) < S3 and S4(II) < S4, the new threshold values
under Incomplete Information , we have the following proposition (see Appendix B.2 for the
proof):
Proposition 2. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is characterized by the wife always sending a
non-informative signal and the husband sending transfers as follows:
(i) t∗∗ = 0 for Y
H
Y H+YW+kHB
> S4(II)
(ii) t∗∗ = B for S3(II) < Y
H
Y H+YW+kLB
< Y
H+B
Y H+YW+kHB
≤ S4(II)
(iii) B > t∗∗ > 0 for Y
H
Y H+YW+kLB
≤ S3(II)
in case (iii) t∗∗ < t∗.
The signal does not affect the transfer; only income distribution between spouses and the
productivity difference matter. The husband uses transfers as a means to balance the marginal
utilities he derives from the two public goods. Thus, he transfers resources to his wife’s plot
because of her productivity advantage, so that she can finance her preferred public good. When
there is high income inequality, only one spouse finances both public goods and there are no
intra-household transfers. Conversely, when income inequality is low, each spouse specializes in
the provision of one public good. Asymmetry of information on the wife’s productivity has an
effect on input allocation only in this situation. Because the husband does not observe his wife’s
productivity, he cannot anticipate how much she will invest in her preferred public good. Thus,
unlike the case where there is perfect information, in this case he will decrease the amount of
inputs transferred to his wife.22
The model yields clear predictions about the relationship between transfers and productivity
in the household, and how asymmetries of information affect them. We can summarize these
predictions as follows. First, we expect transfers to be “intermediate”, meaning strictly between
0 and B, for households in which spouses have “separate spheres” when contributing to public
goods. Second, the amount transferred increases when the wife’s productivity increases. Third,
the increase is lower when the husband does not observe the new level of productivity.
3.3 Discussion: altruistic spouses.
A natural extension of the paper would be to assume spouses are altruistic toward each other.
Although there appears to be less room for altruism to reduce inefficiencies in developing countries
than in developed ones due to the greater frequency of arranged and teenage marriages (see Baland
22Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the household decision-making process.
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and Ziparo 2018 for a discussion), it seems natural to assume some emotional attachment between
spouses.
From a theoretical perspective, a level of altruism that would give equal weight to own con-
sumption and to partner’s consumption would imply an efficient level of contribution to public
goods and, thus, efficient allocation of resources. As discussed for the cooperative case, we can
rule out this hypothesis since a large part of the empirical evidence points to inefficiency in pro-
duction. A low but positive level of altruism would imply a higher contribution to the public
goods for both spouses, thereby reducing the probability that the household ends up in either
the separate-sphere or the breadwinner regime (since the size of the intervals of relative income
in which these regimes exist is reduced).
4 Testing the model’s predictions
In section 2, we highlighted three key findings from the experiment. First, allocative inefficiency
in production arises even when there are no information problems. Second, men respond to a rise
in returns from female plots by increasing their allocation toward them. Third, on average, we
find no impact from private information. In this section, we test two implications of our model
regarding impact from private information. The first sub-section considers the heterogeneity in
the impact from private information, first explaining how we test for it and then presenting our
findings. In the second sub-section, we examine how ex post verifiability affect the impact of
asymmetric information. The last sub-section provides some evidence for the external validity of
our experimental findings.
4.1 Testing for heterogenous response to asymmetric information
We expect asymmetric information to aggravate allocative inefficiency in production under spe-
cialization but to have no impact on households under joint contribution and on those with a
breadwinner. To test these predictions, we contrast choices under hidden treatment (HT ) – i.e.,
with female-held private information on the return from female-held plots – and under experi-
menter treatment (ET ) – i.e., under full information on returns. Importantly, while in section
2 we examined the average impact of asymmetric information and found none, here we identify
differing impacts impact according to choices made in the first round of the game (base treatment
or BT ). Asymmetric information should affect the households in the three regimes differently.
Breadwinner husbands are not expected to transfer any input under asymmetric information
for the same reason they are not expected to transfer any under full information. This type
knows that if his wife were to gain extra income, she would spend it entirely on her private good.
We also expect no effect of asymmetric information for the joint contributors, because husbands
should not care about the exact magnitude of the return: they just need to know that it is higher
on their wife’s plot. Since the women in these households contribute to (at least) one public good
to which also the husbands contribute, husbands can recover a substantial amount of resources
decreasing their public good allocation. Thus, men in joint contributor couples always benefit
from making the efficient production allocation: provided they know that returns on their wife’s
plot are higher than their own returns, allocation will be efficient.
In contrast, we expect the husbands in the specialization regime to allocate less to their wife’s
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plot under asymmetric information. In this regime, wives are expected to spend the additional
income they could earn in the game on their preferred public good, from which their husband
benefits, as well as on their private good. Because the husband knows that his wife cares more
about a particular public good than he does, he does not transfer all of the extra resources to
his wife’s plot, but rather invests in his wife’s plot until he equalizes the marginal benefits he
derives from each public good, resulting in an inefficient production allocation even under full
information. Importantly, it is not enough for him to know that the returns from his wife’s
plot are much higher, he needs to know how much higher they are in order to find the optimal
level of transfer. Under asymmetric information, he expects his wife to have an incentive to
overstate the extent of these returns in order to get a higher transfer. Thus he should respond
to the information asymmetry by reducing the level of the transfer. Moreover, the asymmetric
information treatment HT should have more impact on those who are farther from efficiency
under full information.
One caveat is in order. Theory predicts that breadwinner husbands will choose BT = PT = 0,
those who jointly contribute to a public good with their wife will choose BT = PT = 10 and
households in a separate sphere regime will transfer some intermediate amount 0 < BT < 10 and
0 < PT < 10. However, our data contains no strict breadwinner couples and very few strict joint
contributors (a total of 8). Indeed, if husbands hold social preferences (e.g., altruism, aversion
to inequality), breadwinner husbands may decide to give a small amount to their wife and joint
contributors to keep some for themselves.
We distinguish between 3 categories of households according to the number of tokens allocated
to the wife’s plot at BT . Variables BTj (j = 1, 2, 3) distinguish between husbands who made low
(4 or less for j = 1), intermediate (from 4 to 6 for j = 2) and high (6 or more for j = 3) transfers
to their wife at BT .23
We first plot transfers in ET and HT according to the level of transfers at BT , as described
above (Figure 3). Average transfers are similar in ET and HT in the two top categories (j = 2, 3)
and lower in HT than in ET for the bottom category (j = 1).
Because breadwinners are not expected to be affected by asymmetric information, the esti-
mated impact on the bottom category is interpreted to be a lower-bound for the effect of the
information asymmetry on the separate-sphere type. Note that our findings are robust to a cer-
tain extent to the choice of thresholds in BT . Yet we have too few observations at BT < 1 to
distinguish the effects on breadwinners from those on separate sphere types.
We test for heterogenous impact as follows:
Yi = α+ βHTi + γLowTransfersBTi + δHTi ∗ LowTransfersBTi + i (1)
where Yi is the number of tokens transferred in either ET or HT . HTi is a dummy variable
taking value 1 if spouses are randomly assigned to HT and 0 otherwise. LowTransfersBTi is
a dummy variable taking value 1 if the husband invested less than 5 tokens in the wife’s plot at
baseline. β is the effect on those in the intermediate/high transfer categories at BT (j = 2, 3).
We expect no effect of the hidden treatment on them. We do expect δ < 0, i.e., a negative impact
from the information friction for those who made low transfers at BT .
In Table 5 column 1, we show that the impact of asymmetric information is small and insignif-
23We also discuss the robustness of the findings to the specific thresholds chosen for defining the categories.
17
icant for those who made intermediate/high transfers at BT. Only those who made low transfers
at BT respond to the information frictions and they do so by decreasing the transfer they make
to the female-controlled plot by about 2 units of input (out of 10), a statistically significant drop.
This drop yields an efficiency loss of about 13 percentage points, corresponding to about a 19 per-
cent change.24 This effect, which was hidden when we looked at the average treatment effect, is
consistent with our prediction that the information friction is detrimental only to separate-sphere
households. The estimated effect is a lower-bound on the impact on separate-sphere households:
the low transfers category is a mix of separate-sphere and breadwinner households.
4.2 Testing for the effect of ex post verifiability
What could be driving the efficiency loss experienced by separate-sphere households when infor-
mation is asymmetric? To shed some light on this mechanism, we compare choices made under
full private information (HT) to choices made when both spouses know that the information
will be revealed ex post (RT). Recall that our experiment allows spouses to discuss together.
This is especially true during the information treatments: the experimenter does not provide
much information on returns on female-controlled plots, only indicating that they are at least
as high as in the base treatment. According to our model, the detrimental effect of asymmetric
information arises because spouses are unable to communicate effectively. When information is
verifiable ex post, the cheap-talk game breaks down and wives in separate-sphere households have
a strong incentive to truthfully reveal their returns as long as there is some social cost from ly-
ing. Empirically, this implies that we expect no difference between revealed treatment (verifiable
information) and experimenter treatment (full information on returns) for the separate-sphere
type. Or, equivalently, we should find that wives in separate-sphere households benefit from
higher transfers under RT than under HT.
We find that when households made low transfers at BT, transfers under RT are significantly
higher than transfers under HT (Figure 4). Using a variant of equation (1), we estimate the
impact for those households. They are found to transfer about 2 units of input less (column 2 of
Table 5), an effect which, as expected, is similar in magnitude to the one we find by comparing
HT and ET for this same category of households (column 1 of Table 5). This effect is also
statistically significant. Importantly, these households are the only ones affected by information
verifiability: the impact of asymmetric information is small and insignificant for those who made
intermediate/high transfers at BT. When RT and HT are compared, the estimated impact on
those who made low transfers at BT can be interpreted as a lower-bound for the impact of
information verifiability on separate-sphere households.
These findings are consistent with our model predictions: some households suffer an allocation
efficiency loss due to information frictions, but this loss can be avoided when information is
verifiable ex post, as women truthfully communicate with their husband about the true value of
their returns. This points to communication failure between spouses as the source of the efficiency
loss iunder private information.
An alternative explanation for the efficiency loss under private information is that spouses
24The decrease in efficiency for those who made low transfers at BT is 2/30 ∗ 1.9 = 0.13. Under full information
(HT = 0), these households would experience an efficiency loss of 0.69. The relative loss due to private information
for these households is thus 0.13/0.69 = 0.18.
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cannot perfectly enforce their agreements. If this were the case, however, we would expect
all households to experience the same transfers on average under RT and under HT, including
separate-sphere households. The impact on households would not depend on the level of transfers
made in BT. Moreover, if limited enforcement were to blame for the extra efficiency loss due to
the information asymmetry, information verifiability would not make a difference to any of the
households.
For the sake of completeness, we also provide a comparison of transfers under ET and RT
(Figure 5). As expected, there is no statistically significant difference in transfers for any of the
types of households we identify based on the level of transfer at BT (Table 5 column 3).
To sum up, we find experimental evidence of inefficient allocation decisions, consistent with
other findings based on observational studies. Moreover, we find two pieces of evidence consistent
with the model’s predictions. First, the efficiency loss due to asymmetric information differs in
accordance to the behavior previously observed under full information. Specifically, the extra loss
is concentrated among those showing strong inefficiency (transfers of 4 input units or less) in the
base treatment. Since only households in a separate-sphere regime are expected to be affected by
the information asymmetry, we interpret this effect as a lower bound of the effect on households.
The heterogenous impact of asymmetric information is thus in line with the model’s prediction.
Second, the experimental manipulation of verifiability has a heterogenous effect. This finding
is not consistent with asymmetric information making it harder to enforce agreements, but is
consistent with the model’s prediction. For some households, agreements are self-supporting, and
spouses do not need to be able to communicate about the exact value of returns from the wife’s
plot. For others (in a separate-sphere regime), failure to communicate could explain the extra
loss incurred under information asymmetry.
4.3 External validity
To verify that our findings from the lab-in-the-field actually reflect the real-life decision processes
of our sample of farmers, we use of survey data. As a proxy for the spouses’ rival preferences,
we examine whether spouses who have children from previous unions respond differently to the
information treatments in the game.
We re-estimates columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 to study the heterogenous effect of the information
treatment by number of children that either the wife or the husband had from previous unions
(instead of the level of tranfers at baseline): columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 are in line with the
model’s predictions. First, private information does not affect game decisions when there are no
other children from previous unions (lines 1). Second, when either the husband or the wife has
children from other unions, the allocation to the wife decreases with each additional child from
other unions (line 2). Efficiency losses are avoided when the information is ex post verifiable
(columns 3 and 4).
5 Conclusion
Female farmers are typically engaged in agricultural production on the same farm as their spouse.
The way spouses make decisions over consumption shapes their production decisions, which often
results in a misallocation of resources across plots. Asymmetric information within the household
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may further exacerbate allocative inefficiency. Moreover, one may not be able to rely on effective
communication between spouses to alleviate the information frictions.
We report results from a lab-in-the-field experiment on allocative investment choices by
spouses. Our participant pool are couples of cotton farm producers in Togo and the game is
mildly contextualized to refer to actual input allocation decisions across female-controlled and
male-controlled plots. We provide new evidence of inefficient allocative investment choices by
spouses, corroborating the extensive evidence on farm production inefficiencies when spouses
cultivate separate plots stemming from Udry (1996)’s seminal paper. In addition, using the lab-
in-the-field approach allows us to explore the determinants of these inefficiencies. We propose a
theoretical framework that rationalizes the lab-in-the-field findings and leads to sharp predictions.
In particular, we show both theoretically and empirically that there is substantial heterogeneity
in the magnitude of losses across households, in their response to asymmetric information (from
a treatment in which women are offered the opportunity to hide the true return on investment on
their plot) and in the effect of information verifiability (from a treatment in which, while women
can hide the true return from their husband, the information is verifiable ex post).
Our results call for caution in designing gender-sensitive agricultural policies as these may
backfire depending on intrahousehold dynamics. Extra efficiency losses from ineffective com-
munication may be avoided when agricultural programs that reach out to women also directly
provide information to their spouses.
Our empirical results rely on lab-in-the-field data which may have limited external validity,
though Hoel, Hidrobo, Bernard, and Ashour (2017) provide evidence supporting the use of lab-
based data for studying household behavior.25 Ashraf, Field, Voena, and Ziparo (2019) do find
direct evidence that providing information on maternal health risk to husbands in Zambia is more
effective than providing it to wives based on actual fertility behavior. A natural extension of our
work would be to conduct a similar study looking at agricultural production decisions.
Another natural direction of research consists in extending the model to explore investment
decisions of households with multiple businesses under the control of different members. Looking
at male and female micro entrepreneurs belonging to the same household, Bernhardt, Field,
Pande, and Rigol (2019) provide evidence that, though male- but not female-operated businesses
benefit from access to business grants, there are income gains at the household-level that are
independent of the gender of the recipient. Whether these investments are consistent with efficient
allocative household decisions remains on open question.
25They do so by linking lab-based outcomes to actual real-life choices made outside the lab in the context of
dairy farming in Senegal.
20
References
AGRA (2014): “Africa agriculture status report: climate change and smallholder agriculture in
sub-Saharan Africa.,” Report, Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA).
Akresh, R. (2008): “(In)Efficiency in Intrahousehold Allocations,” .
Anderson, S., and J.-M. Baland (2002): “The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold
Resource Allocation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 963–995.
Andrews, M. J., J. Golan, and J. Lay (2015): “Inefficiency of Male and Female Labor
Supply in Agricultural Households: Evidence from Uganda,” American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 97(3), 998–1019.
Angelucci, M., and R. Garlick (2016): “Heterogeneity in the efficiency of intrahousehold
resource allocation: Empirical evidence and implications for investment in children,” Discussion
paper, Working Paper.
Ashraf, N. (2009): “Spousal control and intra-household decision making: An experimental
study in the Philippines,” The American Economic Review, pp. 1245–1277.
Ashraf, N., E. Field, A. Voena, and R. Ziparo (2019): “Maternal Mortality Risk and the
Gender Gap in Desired Fertility,” Manuscript.
Baland, J.-M., and R. Ziparo (2018): Intra-household bargaining in poor countriesOxford
University Press.
Basu, K. (2006): “Gender and say: A model of household behaviour with endogenously deter-
mined balance of power,” The Economic Journal, 116(511), 558–580.
Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian (1986): “On the private provision of public goods,”
Journal of Public Economics, 29(1), 25–49.
Bernhardt, A., E. Field, R. Pande, and N. Rigol (2019): “Household Matters: Revisit-
ing the Returns to Capital among Female Microentrepreneurs,” American Economic Review:
Insights, 1(2), 141–60.
Browning, M., P.-A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene (2010): “Distributional effects in house-
holds models: separate spheres and income pooling.,” The Economic Journal, 120(545), 786–
799.
Browning, M., P.-A. Chiappori, and Y. Weiss (2014): Economics of the Family, no.
9780521795395 in Cambridge Books. Cambridge University Press.
Doepke, M., and M. Tertilt (2018): “Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic Devel-
opment?,” Working Paper 19888, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Doss, C. (2018): “Women and Agricultural Productivity: Reframing the Issues,” Development
Policy Review, 36(1), 35–50.
21
Fafchamps, M. (2001): Intrahousehold Access to Land and Sources of Inefficiency: Theory and
ConceptsOxford Scholarship Online.
Guirkinger, C., and J.-P. Platteau (2015): “Transformation of the family farm under rising
land pressure: A theoretical essay,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 43(1), 112–137.
Guirkinger, C., J.-P. Platteau, and T. Goetghebuer (2015): “Productive inefficiency in
extended agricultural households: Evidence from Mali,” Journal of Development Economics,
116(C), 17–27.
Hoel, J. B. (2015): “Heterogeneous households: A within-subject test of asymmetric infor-
mation between spouses in Kenya,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 118(C),
123–135.
Hoel, J. B., M. Hidrobo, T. Bernard, and M. Ashour (2017): “Productive inefficiency
in dairy farming and cooperation between spouses: Evidence from Senegal,” IFPRI discussion
papers 1698, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
Kebede, B., M. Tarazona, A. Munro, and A. Verschoor (2014): “Intra-household Effi-
ciency: An Experimental Study from Ethiopia,” Journal of African Economies, 23(1), 105–150.
LaFave, D., and D. Thomas (2016): “Farms, Families, and Markets: New Evidence on Com-
pleteness of Markets in Agricultural Settings,” Econometrica, 84(5), 1917–1960.
Lundberg, S., and R. A. Pollak (1993): “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage
Market,” Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), 988–1010.
Mani, A. (2011): “Mine, Yours or Ours? The Efficiency of Household Investment Decisions:
An Experimental Approach,” Cage online working paper series, Competitive Advantage in the
Global Economy (CAGE).
Mazzocco, M. (2007): “Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and
a Test of Commitment,” Review of Economic Studies, 74(3), 857–895.
Munro, A. (2018): “Intra-household experiments: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Surveys,
32(1), 134–175.
Rangel, M. A., and D. Thomas (2012): “Gender, production and consumption: Allocative
efficiency within farm households,” Photocopy, Princeton University.
Singh, I., L. Squire, and J. Strauss (1986): “A Survey of Agricultural Household Models:
Recent Findings and Policy Implications,” The World Bank Economic Review, 1(1), 149–179.
Udry, C. (1996): “Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household,” Journal
of Political Economy, 104(5), 1010–1046.
Voena, A. (2015): “Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior
of Married Couples?,” American Economic Review, 105(8), 2295–2332.
Wiggins, S. (2014): “African Agricultural Development: Lessons and Challenges,” Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 65(3), 529–556.
22
Ziparo, R. (2016): “Why do spouses communicate: love or interest? A model and some evidence
from Cameroon,” Manuscript.
23
6 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Socio-economic background
Men Women
Head of household/spouse .94 .96
(.23) (.18)
Age 43.94 37.15
(1.1) (1.2)
Education level (%)
No formal schooling 17.73 43.26
Primary level 34.75 45.39
Completed primary level 13.48 4.26
Middle-secondary level 26.95 6.38
Completed middle-secondary level 2.84 .71
High school 3.55 0
Higher education .71 0
Test scores (over 10)
Reading 6.63 2.24
(4.62) (4)
Writing 6.12 2.96
(4.47) (4.20)
Counting 9.64 8.12
(1.85) (3.84)
Numbers reading 7.5 3.93
(3.98) (4.71)
Number of children with partner 4.75
(2.01)
Number of children with others 2.02 0.3
(3.58) (1.06)
Primary spending (%)
Food 21.28 34.75
Schooling 29.08 22.7
Children’s health 39.72 19.15
Other 9.93 23.4
Household size 8.76
(4.1)
Years in marital union 19.01
(8.98)
Own a bicycle .44
(.50)
Own a motorcycle .53
(.50)
Experienced hunger in the last 3 months .08
(.28)
Source: Authors’ computations from own data sources
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Table 2: Agricultural production
Men Women
Total plot area farmed (in ha) 7.34 1.74
(6.98) (1.96)
Main plot
Control over income and input (%) 82.9 65.9
Own time spent per week (hrs) 33.47 26.14
(11.2) (11.1)
Spouse’s time spent per week (hrs) 22.98 16.46
(13.94) (12.56)
Value of production from spouse’s main plot
(last season)
Mostly know (%) 73.75 57.44
Wants to know more (%) 55.31 46.1
Value of production from one own’s plot
(last season)
Believe sp. mostly know (%) 83.45 81.56
Believe sp. wants to know more (%) 43.26 39
Source: Authors’ computations from own data sources
Table 3: Control over decision on inputs allocation to female plots (%)
Women Only Men Only Jointly
Family labor 17 63.1 19.1
Hired labor 7.1 64.5 20.5
Fertilizer 17 63.8 18.4
Seeds 27.6 53.2 18.4
Source: Authors’ computations from own data sources
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Table 5: Estimation of the effects of the information asymmetry on transfers: heterogenous
effects in relation to past transfers.
(1) (2) (3)
HT vs ET HT vs RT ET vs RT
Direct effect .29 .40 .11
( .45) (.35) (.45)
Low transfers at BT -1.87 -1.91 -1.91
(.83) (.80) (.80)
Interaction w/ low transfers at BT -1.90 -1.86 .03
(.97) (.94) (1.15)
Intercept 7.27 7.16 7.16
(.37) (.25) (.25)
Obs. 90 102 90
Robust SE in parenthesis.
Table 6: Estimation of the effects of the information asymmetry on transfers: heterogenous
effects in relation to children from previous unions
HT vs ET RT vs ET
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife’s child. Husband’s child. Wife’s child. Husband’s child.
HT -.09 .06
(.50) (.55)
HT* -.71 -.22
Children (.27) (.12)
RT .19 .20
(.46) (.50)
RT* -.36 -.11
Children (.28) (.11)
Obs. 90 90 90 90
Robust SE in parenthesis.
27
Figure 1: Structure of the decision making process in the household
 
 
 
Agricultural	project	participation:	
The	household	participates	in	an	agricultural	project	and	receives	an	
input	endowment	
Communication:	
The		wife	shares	the	information	regarding	her	productivity	(cheap	talk)	
with	her	husband	
Input	allocation:	
The	husband	decides	the	optimal	amount	of	inputs	to	allocate	to	his	wife	
Production	and	income:	
The	separate	agricultural	plots	yield	individual	incomes	according	
to	productivity	and	allocated	input		
Investment	in	household	public	goods:	
Husband	and	wife	decide	simultaneously	and	separately	how	much	to	
invest	in	household’s	public	good	and	private	consumption	
 
Consumption:	
Husband	and	wife	consume	the	public	and	individual	private	goods	
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Figure 2: Distribution of transfers
Source: Own data sources
Figure 3:
Source: own data sources
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Figure 4:
Source: own data sources
Figure 5:
Source: own data sources
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Gender, information and the efficiency of household
production decisions: An experiment in rural Togo
Online Appendix
September 17, 2019
A Experimental Design
The following is a brief description of the experimental games, with a summary of the protocols
(full version available in French and Ewe upon request).
Context and general instructions Each couple is invited to participate in 2 games. Game
1 (BT in the text) is the same for everyone. Subsequently 3 versions of Game 2 (ET , RT and
HT in the text) are randomly assigned. At registration, each couple receives an identification tag
featuring the letter corresponding to their Game 2 assignment and their order of arrival.
Husbands and wives are placed in separate areas and assigned individual experimenters. To
ensure confidentiality, experimenter-participant pairs are situated beyond hearing distance of
each other. During the experiment, each experimenter reads the instructions aloud, explains
them and tests the participant’s understanding with questions. The game moves on only after
each participant provides correct answers to all questions.
Participants are told they can each earn money during the games, the amount they receive
being based both on the decisions made by the husband during the games and on the outcomes
of two lotteries. These lotteries take place at the end of the games. The first lottery determines
whether game 1 gains or game 2 gains will apply.The second lottery can increase or decrease the
amount selected in the first lottery – there is even a chance of earning nothing. To place the second
lottery in a realistic context, the experimenter refers to uncertainty in agricultural production
related to unexpected events (weather, pests) that may act as positive or negative shocks and
reminds participants how, when these events are extreme, farmers may lose everything.
Both husbands and wives know that their gains will be partly determined by the lotteries.
Altough they know the basic structure of the lotteries, the wives are not invited to observe the
lottery outcome. Payments are made in an individual and confidential way to each spouse. The
husbands are informed that no one, including their wife, will know or can guess the decision they
made and how much they will earn. The wives are informed that no one, except their husband,
will know or can guess how much they will earn.
Game 1 (Base Treatment, same for all): Both men and women know the following:
• There are two separate plots of farmland. The woman is responsible for one of them, the
man for the other.
• They have an endowment of 10 units of input to allocate between the two plots.
• Returns on each plot are constant, but they are twice as high on the female’s plot as on
the male’s. In other words, yields increase linearly with the amount of input units used on
each plot, but the increase is twice as high on the female’s plot as on to the male’s.
• They can talk freely for 5 minutes after they receive all instructions.
• The husband makes the allocation decision. He makes this decision privately after the
couple’s discussion.
• The husband is informed of potential gains from game 1 for himself and for his wife. Women
neither observe nor are told about their husband’s choice. They are not told how much they
can earn from game 1.
• Both will take part in game 2.
Game 2
2
Experimenter Treatment (ET) Same as Base Treatment (BT ), the only difference being
that now the returns from the female’s plot are three times higher than from the male’s. Partici-
pants are explicitly told that this is the only difference from the previous game. The experimenter
reads the instructions and tests understanding. The men make a decision. As in BT , each man
knows the potential gains he and his wife may make from game 2. As in BT , the women do not.
Hidden Treatment (HT) There are two differences from BT that both members of the
couple are informed of:
1. The experimenter tells the husbands that returns on their wife’s plot are at least as large
as in game 1 and that the returns on their own plot are unchanged.
2. The wife, rather than the experimenter, is now in charge of communicating the information
on the returns from her plot.
As in BT , each man knows the potential gains he and his wife can make from game 2. As in
BT , the wives do not, nor do they know the decision made by their husband.
Revealed Treatment (RT) There are three differences from BT that both members of
the couple are informed of:
1. The experimenter tells the husbands that returns on their wife’s plot are at least as large
as in game 1 and that the returns on their own plot are unchanged.
2. The wife, rather than the experimenter, is now in charge of communicating the information
on the returns from her plot.
3. Both male and female participants know that the husbands will learn from the experimenters
the returns on their wife’s plot once they have made their allocation decision.
As in BT , each man knows the potential gains he and his wife can make from game 2. As in
BT , the wives do not, nor do they know the decision made by their husband.
B Theoretical Appendix
B.1 Cooperative decision-making
B.1.1 Optimal consumption allocations
We define γ as the pareto weight of the wife and (1− γ) that of the husband. Thus, the
household maximization problem is the following:
Max γUWi + (1− γ)UHi (2)
which gives the optimal consumption levels:
Q∗A =
1+(α−1)γ
3+(α−1)γ (Y
H + Y W )
Q∗B =
C∗W
γ =
C∗H
(1−γ) =
1
3+(α−1)γ (Y
H + Y W )
Optimal transfers
In this case the indirect utility of the husband is:
V H(t) = log
(
1 + (α− 1)γ
3 + (α− 1)γ (Y
H +B − t+ Y W + kt)
)
+
(2− γ) log
(
Y H +B − t+ Y W + kt
3 + (α− 1)γ
)
3
This is clearly maximized for t∗ = B.
B.2 Proofs
Proof. Proposition 1
Going backward, the two-stage game has the following decision structure:
In stage 2, the spouses simultaneously solve the following maximization problem:
max
cj ,qjA,q
j
B
log(cj) + log(QA) + log(QB), for j=H,W
subject to cj + qjA + q
j
B ≤ RJ .
The first-order conditions for this maximization problem for both spouses give the following set
of equations:
qHA + q
W
A ≥ RH − qHA − qHB ,
qHB + q
W
B ≥ RH − qHA − qHB ,
qHA + q
W
A ≥ α(RW − qWA − qWB ),
qHB + q
W
B ≥ RW − qWA − qWB .
(3)
For each spouse to contribute to both public goods, all four equations should be satisfied with
equality. However, as α > 0, it is immediately clear that this is impossible. The spouses
contribute together at most to one public good, either A or B. Also, in equilibrium, the wife
always contributes more to good A than B, and the contrary is true for the husband.
We now study the different regimes of contribution to public goods. Let S = RH/(RH +RW )
be the husband’s income share. Table A1 presents all cases. We define four thresholds:
S1 = R
H/3, S2 = 2/(3 + α), S3 = 2α/(1 + 3α), and S4 = 3α/(1 + 3α). As the husband’s income
share decreases from S4, the wife starts contributing to QA until the household reaches the
separate-sphere regime where each spouse specializes in the production of one public good
(when S2 < S < S3). As S decreases further, the wife starts contributing to both goods until
the husbands stops contributing altogether (when S < S1).
Then, in the first stage, the husband determines the optimal level of transfers, t, taking as given
the intra-household equilibrium of the second stage. Thus, he solves the following problem:
max
t
V H(t)
subject to t ≤ B.
where V H(t) is the indirect utility of the husband.
In this case, the indirect utility of the husband varies depending on the relative income . The
equilibirum relative interval income in which the households ends up in changes with
equilibrium transfers. We focus here on the cases in which the husband is richer, his initial
income share being greater than 1/2.
The husband’s indirect utility in the second stage is
V H(t) = 3 log
(
Y H+B−t
3
)
for S(B) > S4
V H(t) = 3 log
(
α
1+3α(Y
H +B − t+ Y W + kt)
)
for S3 < S(B) < S(0) ≤ S4
V H(t) = 2 log
(
Y H+B−t
2
)
+ log
(
αYW+kt
1+α
)
for S(0) ≤ S3
with S(B) = Y H/(Y H + Y W + kB) the husband’s income share when he transfers the total
assets B to his wife, and S(0) = (Y H +B)/(Y H + Y W +B) his income share when he keeps all
the assets.
For S(B) > S4, it follows immediately that t
∗ = 0 . For S(0) < S4, when both spouses are
contributing to the same public good, t∗ = B. Instead, for S(B) < S4 < S(0), we have that
4
either t∗ = B or t∗ = B depending on the level of k.
In particular, the condition for t∗ = B (t∗ = 0) is k ≥ 1+3α3α (<).
Finally, when S(0) < S3, the husband solves the following maximization problem:
max
t
2 log
(
Y H+B−t
2
)
+ log
(
αYW+αkt
1+α
)
subject to t ≤ B.
(4)
The optimal level of transfers in this case is
t∗ = Y
H+B
2 − 2Y
W
3k . (5)
Also, when S(B) ≤ S3 < S(0), we can identify the level of transfers that induces a regime
change from joint contribution to specialization: t¯ = [(1 + α)(Y H +B)− 2αY W ]/[2αk + 1 + α].
Since it can easily be shown that t∗ = [(Y H +B)/2]− [2Y W /(3k)] is always greater than t¯, it
follows that this is the optimal level in this case.
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Table A1: Public good contribution regimes.
Husband’s income share S Cases of contribution Equilibrium levels of public goods
H=Husband, W=Wife
S > S4 H: both goods q
H
A = q
H
B =
1
3R
H
W: none
S3 < S < S4 H: both goods q
H
A =
1+α
1+3αR
H − 2α1+3αRW
qHB =
α
1+3αR
W + α1+3αR
H
W: good A qWA =
3α
1+3αR
W − 11+3αRH
S2 < S < S3 H: good B q
H
B =
1
2R
H
W: good A qWA =
α
1+αR
W
(Separate Spheres)
S1 < S < S3 H: good B q
H
B =
1+2α
1+3αR
H − 1+2α3(1+3α)RW
W: both goods qWA =
α
1+3αR
W + α1+3αR
H
qWB =
2(1+α)
3(1+3α)R
W − 1+α1+3αRH
S < S1 H: none q
W
A =
α
2+αR
W
W: both goods qWB =
1
2+αR
W
Notes: S1 = R
H/3, S2 = 3(1 + α)/(5 + 7α), S3 = 2α/(1 + 3α), and S4 = 3α/(1 + 3α).
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Proof. Proposition 2 Going backward, the PBNE of three-stage game is as determined as
follows: first, we derive optimal public good contributions given the information structure; then
we find optimal transfers, given the information structure; then, we solve the communication
equilibrium.
In stage 3, conditional on the available information, spouses simultaneously solve the following
maximization problems:
max
qWA (m),q
W
B (m)
log(Y W + kt(m)− qWA (m)− qWB (m)|k) + α log(QA(m)|k) + log(QB(m)|k)
max
qHA (m),q
H
B (m)
log(Y H +B − t(m)− qHA (m)− qHB (m)|m) + E(log(QA(m))|m) + E(log(QB(m))|m)
In stage 2, the husband solves:
max
t
E[V H(t)|m]
In stage 1, the wife solves:
max
m
V W (m)
In stage 1, the husband decides his contribution to the household public goods based on the
expected behavior of the wife, given the wife’s observed income and the productivity inferred
through the message she sent in stage 1; the wife, however, is perfectly informed. Again, in
stage 2, the husband decides how much to assign to the wife, based on the message she sent in
stage 1. Finally, when deciding which message to send the wife takes into account how it is
going to affect the husband’s behavior in stages 2 and 3.
The BNE of the public good contribution, in stage 3, exists for every p∗(k|m) (the husband
posterior of the distribution of productivity given the message) resulting from the
communication game and every t∗(k|m) resulting from the transfer equilibrium as the Kakutani
Fixed Point applies.
In stage 3, the first-order conditions of the maximization problem of the wife are the same as
the complete information problem. Given the public good contributions, the first-order
condition for good A of the husband becomes:
1
Y H+B−t−qHA−qHB
=
∫ k
k
1
qHA+q
W
A (x)
F (x)dx.
As before, we study how the husband’s contribution varies with (expected) relative income. We
make one simplifying assumption: the k − k interval (the biggest interval on which, after
communication, the productivity can be distributed , i.e. the interval corresponding to no
information updating) is such that the distribution of expected relative income when all the
resources are given to the wife is smaller than the smallest contribution interval (either S2 − S3
or S3 − S4 or S4 − 1). We also denote E(k) = k′.
When the relative income of the husband is very high, qWA (k) = 0 for every k. Then, we want to
identify the level of (actual) relative income at which the wife starts contributing to good A. We
know that this level is exactly equal to S4 when the husband is completely informed. Now
assume we are in the joint-contribution relative-income interval and the husband has rational
expectations about the productivity of the wife. We can define k4 : limk→k4 qWA (k)→ 0. The
first-order condition of the husband becomes:
1
Y H+B−t−qHA−qHB
=
∫ k4
k
1
qHA
F (x)dx+
∫ k
k4
1
qHA+q
W
A (x)
F (x)dx.
Since
∫ k
k4
1
qHA+q
W
A (x)
F (x)dx <
∫ k
k4
1
qHA
F (x)dx, it follows that in S4, with incomplete information
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(II), q∗∗HA < q
∗H
A . So the level of relative income at which q
W
A starts to be 0 is lower than S4.
Symmetrically, we want to see what happens on the other edge of the interval, when the
(actual) relative income is equal toS3. Here, we compare the marginal return on consumption
and public goods when qHA = 0 (the optimal value in S3 with complete information). Since we
know that u′(.) is convex in qHA it follows that:
1
Y H+B−t−qHB
>
∫ k
k
1
qWA (x)
F (x)dx.
Thus in S3, with II, q
∗∗H
A > 0. So the level at which q
H
A starts to be 0 is lower than S3.
The two thresholds are thus pushed towards the left.
We now analyze Stage 2 and derive the level of optimal transfers:
• when [ RH
RH+RW (kB)
− RH
RH+RW (kB)
] ∈ [S4 − 1]→ t∗∗ = 0;
• when [ RH
RH+RW (kB)
− RH
RH+RW (kB)
] ∈ [S3 − S4]→ t∗∗ = B;
• when RH
RH+RW (0)
< S3 then t
∗∗ = 0;
• it is easy to show that t∗∗ = B as long as q∗∗HA > 0 even when
S3 ∈ [ RHRH+RW (kB) − R
H
RH+RW (kB)
];
• when S3 ∈ [ RHRH+RW (kB) − R
H
RH+RW (kB)
] and q∗∗HA = 0 we have t
∗∗ < t∗ since the shape of
the utility functioin imply that the Relative Risk Aversion of the husband is equale to 1.
This in turns implies that the husband needs to reduce the transfer he sends to the wife,
as compared to the complete information case, to equate the marginal utility from private
consumption and from his preferred public good to the marginal utility of the public good
provided by the wife that is now uncertian.
Finally, for all productivity levels, within a certain interval of relative income (perfectly
observed by the wife), all types prefer to send the same message and no communication is
possible in equilibrium (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). More formally: let’s define as mH = k as
the message that the wife would send in equilibrium when the productivity realization is k.
From the best reaction function of the husband with complete information, we know that
t∗(k) = tmax∗ that means that when the wife sends the message mH the husband will send the
highest transfer. Since the Indirect Utility of the wife is growing in t, whatever the productivity
realisation is, she will always declare mH = k . It follows immediately that p(k|m) = F (k).
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A Experimental Design
The following is a brief description of the experimental games, with a summary of the protocols
(full version available in French and Ewe upon request).
Context and general instructions Each couple is invited to participate in 2 games. Game
1 (BT in the text) is the same for everyone. Subsequently 3 versions of Game 2 (ET , RT and
HT in the text) are randomly assigned. At registration, each couple receives an identification tag
featuring the letter corresponding to their Game 2 assignment and their order of arrival.
Husbands and wives are placed in separate areas and assigned individual experimenters. To
ensure confidentiality, experimenter-participant pairs are situated beyond hearing distance of
each other. During the experiment, each experimenter reads the instructions aloud, explains
them and tests the participant’s understanding with questions. The game moves on only after
each participant provides correct answers to all questions.
Participants are told they can each earn money during the games, the amount they receive
being based both on the decisions made by the husband during the games and on the outcomes
of two lotteries. These lotteries take place at the end of the games. The first lottery determines
whether game 1 gains or game 2 gains will apply.The second lottery can increase or decrease the
amount selected in the first lottery – there is even a chance of earning nothing. To place the second
lottery in a realistic context, the experimenter refers to uncertainty in agricultural production
related to unexpected events (weather, pests) that may act as positive or negative shocks and
reminds participants how, when these events are extreme, farmers may lose everything.
Both husbands and wives know that their gains will be partly determined by the lotteries.
Altough they know the basic structure of the lotteries, the wives are not invited to observe the
lottery outcome. Payments are made in an individual and confidential way to each spouse. The
husbands are informed that no one, including their wife, will know or can guess the decision they
made and how much they will earn. The wives are informed that no one, except their husband,
will know or can guess how much they will earn.
Game 1 (Base Treatment, same for all): Both men and women know the following:
• There are two separate plots of farmland. The woman is responsible for one of them, the
man for the other.
• They have an endowment of 10 units of input to allocate between the two plots.
• Returns on each plot are constant, but they are twice as high on the female’s plot as on
the male’s. In other words, yields increase linearly with the amount of input units used on
each plot, but the increase is twice as high on the female’s plot as on to the male’s.
• They can talk freely for 5 minutes after they receive all instructions.
• The husband makes the allocation decision. He makes this decision privately after the
couple’s discussion.
• The husband is informed of potential gains from game 1 for himself and for his wife. Women
neither observe nor are told about their husband’s choice. They are not told how much they
can earn from game 1.
• Both will take part in game 2.
Game 2
2
Experimenter Treatment (ET) Same as Base Treatment (BT ), the only difference being
that now the returns from the female’s plot are three times higher than from the male’s. Partici-
pants are explicitly told that this is the only difference from the previous game. The experimenter
reads the instructions and tests understanding. The men make a decision. As in BT , each man
knows the potential gains he and his wife may make from game 2. As in BT , the women do not.
Hidden Treatment (HT) There are two differences from BT that both members of the
couple are informed of:
1. The experimenter tells the husbands that returns on their wife’s plot are at least as large
as in game 1 and that the returns on their own plot are unchanged.
2. The wife, rather than the experimenter, is now in charge of communicating the information
on the returns from her plot.
As in BT , each man knows the potential gains he and his wife can make from game 2. As in
BT , the wives do not, nor do they know the decision made by their husband.
Revealed Treatment (RT) There are three differences from BT that both members of
the couple are informed of:
1. The experimenter tells the husbands that returns on their wife’s plot are at least as large
as in game 1 and that the returns on their own plot are unchanged.
2. The wife, rather than the experimenter, is now in charge of communicating the information
on the returns from her plot.
3. Both male and female participants know that the husbands will learn from the experimenters
the returns on their wife’s plot once they have made their allocation decision.
As in BT , each man knows the potential gains he and his wife can make from game 2. As in
BT , the wives do not, nor do they know the decision made by their husband.
B Theoretical Appendix
B.1 Cooperative decision-making
B.1.1 Optimal consumption allocations
We define γ as the pareto weight of the wife and (1− γ) that of the husband. Thus, the
household maximization problem is the following:
Max γUWi + (1− γ)UHi (2)
which gives the optimal consumption levels:
Q∗A =
1+(α−1)γ
3+(α−1)γ (Y
H + Y W )
Q∗B =
C∗W
γ =
C∗H
(1−γ) =
1
3+(α−1)γ (Y
H + Y W )
Optimal transfers
In this case the indirect utility of the husband is:
V H(t) = log
(
1 + (α− 1)γ
3 + (α− 1)γ (Y
H +B − t+ Y W + kt)
)
+
(2− γ) log
(
Y H +B − t+ Y W + kt
3 + (α− 1)γ
)
3
This is clearly maximized for t∗ = B.
B.2 Proofs
Proof. Proposition 1
Going backward, the two-stage game has the following decision structure:
In stage 2, the spouses simultaneously solve the following maximization problem:
max
cj ,qjA,q
j
B
log(cj) + log(QA) + log(QB), for j=H,W
subject to cj + qjA + q
j
B ≤ RJ .
The first-order conditions for this maximization problem for both spouses give the following set
of equations:
qHA + q
W
A ≥ RH − qHA − qHB ,
qHB + q
W
B ≥ RH − qHA − qHB ,
qHA + q
W
A ≥ α(RW − qWA − qWB ),
qHB + q
W
B ≥ RW − qWA − qWB .
(3)
For each spouse to contribute to both public goods, all four equations should be satisfied with
equality. However, as α > 0, it is immediately clear that this is impossible. The spouses
contribute together at most to one public good, either A or B. Also, in equilibrium, the wife
always contributes more to good A than B, and the contrary is true for the husband.
We now study the different regimes of contribution to public goods. Let S = RH/(RH +RW )
be the husband’s income share. Table A1 presents all cases. We define four thresholds:
S1 = R
H/3, S2 = 2/(3 + α), S3 = 2α/(1 + 3α), and S4 = 3α/(1 + 3α). As the husband’s income
share decreases from S4, the wife starts contributing to QA until the household reaches the
separate-sphere regime where each spouse specializes in the production of one public good
(when S2 < S < S3). As S decreases further, the wife starts contributing to both goods until
the husbands stops contributing altogether (when S < S1).
Then, in the first stage, the husband determines the optimal level of transfers, t, taking as given
the intra-household equilibrium of the second stage. Thus, he solves the following problem:
max
t
V H(t)
subject to t ≤ B.
where V H(t) is the indirect utility of the husband.
In this case, the indirect utility of the husband varies depending on the relative income . The
equilibirum relative interval income in which the households ends up in changes with
equilibrium transfers. We focus here on the cases in which the husband is richer, his initial
income share being greater than 1/2.
The husband’s indirect utility in the second stage is
V H(t) = 3 log
(
Y H+B−t
3
)
for S(B) > S4
V H(t) = 3 log
(
α
1+3α(Y
H +B − t+ Y W + kt)
)
for S3 < S(B) < S(0) ≤ S4
V H(t) = 2 log
(
Y H+B−t
2
)
+ log
(
αYW+kt
1+α
)
for S(0) ≤ S3
with S(B) = Y H/(Y H + Y W + kB) the husband’s income share when he transfers the total
assets B to his wife, and S(0) = (Y H +B)/(Y H + Y W +B) his income share when he keeps all
the assets.
For S(B) > S4, it follows immediately that t
∗ = 0 . For S(0) < S4, when both spouses are
contributing to the same public good, t∗ = B. Instead, for S(B) < S4 < S(0), we have that
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either t∗ = B or t∗ = B depending on the level of k.
In particular, the condition for t∗ = B (t∗ = 0) is k ≥ 1+3α3α (<).
Finally, when S(0) < S3, the husband solves the following maximization problem:
max
t
2 log
(
Y H+B−t
2
)
+ log
(
αYW+αkt
1+α
)
subject to t ≤ B.
(4)
The optimal level of transfers in this case is
t∗ = Y
H+B
2 − 2Y
W
3k . (5)
Also, when S(B) ≤ S3 < S(0), we can identify the level of transfers that induces a regime
change from joint contribution to specialization: t¯ = [(1 + α)(Y H +B)− 2αY W ]/[2αk + 1 + α].
Since it can easily be shown that t∗ = [(Y H +B)/2]− [2Y W /(3k)] is always greater than t¯, it
follows that this is the optimal level in this case.
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Table A1: Public good contribution regimes.
Husband’s income share S Cases of contribution Equilibrium levels of public goods
H=Husband, W=Wife
S > S4 H: both goods q
H
A = q
H
B =
1
3R
H
W: none
S3 < S < S4 H: both goods q
H
A =
1+α
1+3αR
H − 2α1+3αRW
qHB =
α
1+3αR
W + α1+3αR
H
W: good A qWA =
3α
1+3αR
W − 11+3αRH
S2 < S < S3 H: good B q
H
B =
1
2R
H
W: good A qWA =
α
1+αR
W
(Separate Spheres)
S1 < S < S3 H: good B q
H
B =
1+2α
1+3αR
H − 1+2α3(1+3α)RW
W: both goods qWA =
α
1+3αR
W + α1+3αR
H
qWB =
2(1+α)
3(1+3α)R
W − 1+α1+3αRH
S < S1 H: none q
W
A =
α
2+αR
W
W: both goods qWB =
1
2+αR
W
Notes: S1 = R
H/3, S2 = 3(1 + α)/(5 + 7α), S3 = 2α/(1 + 3α), and S4 = 3α/(1 + 3α).
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Proof. Proposition 2 Going backward, the PBNE of three-stage game is as determined as
follows: first, we derive optimal public good contributions given the information structure; then
we find optimal transfers, given the information structure; then, we solve the communication
equilibrium.
In stage 3, conditional on the available information, spouses simultaneously solve the following
maximization problems:
max
qWA (m),q
W
B (m)
log(Y W + kt(m)− qWA (m)− qWB (m)|k) + α log(QA(m)|k) + log(QB(m)|k)
max
qHA (m),q
H
B (m)
log(Y H +B − t(m)− qHA (m)− qHB (m)|m) + E(log(QA(m))|m) + E(log(QB(m))|m)
In stage 2, the husband solves:
max
t
E[V H(t)|m]
In stage 1, the wife solves:
max
m
V W (m)
In stage 1, the husband decides his contribution to the household public goods based on the
expected behavior of the wife, given the wife’s observed income and the productivity inferred
through the message she sent in stage 1; the wife, however, is perfectly informed. Again, in
stage 2, the husband decides how much to assign to the wife, based on the message she sent in
stage 1. Finally, when deciding which message to send the wife takes into account how it is
going to affect the husband’s behavior in stages 2 and 3.
The BNE of the public good contribution, in stage 3, exists for every p∗(k|m) (the husband
posterior of the distribution of productivity given the message) resulting from the
communication game and every t∗(k|m) resulting from the transfer equilibrium as the Kakutani
Fixed Point applies.
In stage 3, the first-order conditions of the maximization problem of the wife are the same as
the complete information problem. Given the public good contributions, the first-order
condition for good A of the husband becomes:
1
Y H+B−t−qHA−qHB
=
∫ k
k
1
qHA+q
W
A (x)
F (x)dx.
As before, we study how the husband’s contribution varies with (expected) relative income. We
make one simplifying assumption: the k − k interval (the biggest interval on which, after
communication, the productivity can be distributed , i.e. the interval corresponding to no
information updating) is such that the distribution of expected relative income when all the
resources are given to the wife is smaller than the smallest contribution interval (either S2 − S3
or S3 − S4 or S4 − 1). We also denote E(k) = k′.
When the relative income of the husband is very high, qWA (k) = 0 for every k. Then, we want to
identify the level of (actual) relative income at which the wife starts contributing to good A. We
know that this level is exactly equal to S4 when the husband is completely informed. Now
assume we are in the joint-contribution relative-income interval and the husband has rational
expectations about the productivity of the wife. We can define k4 : limk→k4 qWA (k)→ 0. The
first-order condition of the husband becomes:
1
Y H+B−t−qHA−qHB
=
∫ k4
k
1
qHA
F (x)dx+
∫ k
k4
1
qHA+q
W
A (x)
F (x)dx.
Since
∫ k
k4
1
qHA+q
W
A (x)
F (x)dx <
∫ k
k4
1
qHA
F (x)dx, it follows that in S4, with incomplete information
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(II), q∗∗HA < q
∗H
A . So the level of relative income at which q
W
A starts to be 0 is lower than S4.
Symmetrically, we want to see what happens on the other edge of the interval, when the
(actual) relative income is equal toS3. Here, we compare the marginal return on consumption
and public goods when qHA = 0 (the optimal value in S3 with complete information). Since we
know that u′(.) is convex in qHA it follows that:
1
Y H+B−t−qHB
>
∫ k
k
1
qWA (x)
F (x)dx.
Thus in S3, with II, q
∗∗H
A > 0. So the level at which q
H
A starts to be 0 is lower than S3.
The two thresholds are thus pushed towards the left.
We now analyze Stage 2 and derive the level of optimal transfers:
• when [ RH
RH+RW (kB)
− RH
RH+RW (kB)
] ∈ [S4 − 1]→ t∗∗ = 0;
• when [ RH
RH+RW (kB)
− RH
RH+RW (kB)
] ∈ [S3 − S4]→ t∗∗ = B;
• when RH
RH+RW (0)
< S3 then t
∗∗ = 0;
• it is easy to show that t∗∗ = B as long as q∗∗HA > 0 even when
S3 ∈ [ RHRH+RW (kB) − R
H
RH+RW (kB)
];
• when S3 ∈ [ RHRH+RW (kB) − R
H
RH+RW (kB)
] and q∗∗HA = 0 we have t
∗∗ < t∗ since the shape of
the utility functioin imply that the Relative Risk Aversion of the husband is equale to 1.
This in turns implies that the husband needs to reduce the transfer he sends to the wife,
as compared to the complete information case, to equate the marginal utility from private
consumption and from his preferred public good to the marginal utility of the public good
provided by the wife that is now uncertian.
Finally, for all productivity levels, within a certain interval of relative income (perfectly
observed by the wife), all types prefer to send the same message and no communication is
possible in equilibrium (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). More formally: let’s define as mH = k as
the message that the wife would send in equilibrium when the productivity realization is k.
From the best reaction function of the husband with complete information, we know that
t∗(k) = tmax∗ that means that when the wife sends the message mH the husband will send the
highest transfer. Since the Indirect Utility of the wife is growing in t, whatever the productivity
realisation is, she will always declare mH = k . It follows immediately that p(k|m) = F (k).
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